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Abstract 
 
This paper introduces a new concept for full implementation that takes into account 
agents’ preferences for understanding how the “process” works. We assume that the agents 
have an intrinsic preference for honesty in the sense that they dislike the idea of lying when 
it does not influence their welfare but instead goes against the intention of the principal. We 
show that the presence of such preferences functions very effectively in eliminating 
unwanted equilibria from the practical perspectives, even if the degree of preference for 
honesty is small. The mechanisms designed are detail-free and involve only small fines. 
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1. Introduction 
 
  This paper introduces a new concept for full implementation that takes into account 
agents’ preferences for understanding (not just the consequence but also) how the 
“process” works. We investigate environments in which a principal is unaware of the 
desirable alternative to be chosen, even though there exist multiple agents and they do have 
information about such an alternative. The principal delegates the alternative choice to 
these agents by designing an appropriate mechanism, according to which each agent is 
required to make multiple announcements about this alternative. The crucial assumption of 
this paper is that each of these agents has an intrinsic preference for honesty in the sense 
that she dislikes the idea of telling “white lies” that do not influence her welfare but instead 
go against the intention of the principal. This paper shows that with this assumption, it is 
very easy for the latter to incentivize the agents into telling the truth as the unique 
iteratively undominated strategy profile, thereby implementing the desirable alternative 
fully, and exactly, even if she does not have any information about this alternative in 
advance. 
First, we consider a situation in which there exist three agents who have a full 
knowledge of the desirable alternative. Using only small fines, we show a very permissive 
result that there exists an almighty mechanism according to which the principal can achieve 
any alternative, provided that these agents regard this alternative as being desirable. This 
mechanism is detail-free in a very strict sense, i.e., it does not depend on the details of 
model specifications such as the state space. In this mechanism, the alternative choice and   4
the monetary transfer to an agent are never influenced by her first announcement. Since this 
agent has an intrinsic preference for honesty, it follows that she has a strict incentive to 
make her first announcement honestly. By using this honest announcement as a reference, 
and by punishing any other agent who is the first to deviate from this reference, the 
principal can incentivize all agents into telling the truth as the unique iteratively 
undominated strategy profile. 
  Second, we consider a Bayesian environment in which there exist multiple agents who 
do not have a full knowledge but have their respective private signals concerning the 
desirable alternative. We cannot use another agent’s announcement as a reference to 
determine whether an agent is telling the truth because the private signals of all agents are 
different from each other. However, we can show that whenever the monetary fine is close 
to zero, the principal can incentivize each agent into telling the truth by regarding her own 
first announcement as the reference. Based on Abreu and Matsushima (1992b), without 
contradicting the requirement of full implementation, we can make monetary transfers as 
close to zero as possible. Hence, it follows from these observations that we can obtain a 
very permissive result that every incentive compatible social choice function is fully 
implementable in iterative dominance. We do not need any other condition apart from 
incentive compatibility. The designed mechanism is detail-free, i.e., it does not depend on 
the probability function on the state space. These features are in contrast with the previous 
works in the implementation literature, where agents’ intrinsic preferences for honesty were 
not generally taken into account.
1 
                                                 
1 See survey articles such as Moore (1992), Palfrey (1992), Osborne and Rubinstein (1994, Chapter 10), and Maskin   5
The class of preferences for honesty considered in this paper covers many cases of the 
previous models such as Baiman and Lewis (1989) and Gneezy (2005). Baiman and Lewis 
investigated the threshold model in which each individual experiences fixed disutility from 
lying. Gneezy conducted laboratory experiments and showed that whether or not an 
individual lies depends on not just her own payoff but also other persons’ payoffs. Our 
permissive results are independent of the degree to which the agents prefer to be honest. In 
this respect, we can state that our results hold even under the minimal requirement of the 
agents’ preferences for honesty. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 shows the basic result of full 
implementation where the three agents have a full knowledge of the desirable alternative. 
Section 3 investigates the Bayesian environments and shows that incentive compatibility is 
necessary and sufficient for full implementation. 
                                                                                                                                                     
and Sjöström (2002). However, there are certain exceptions such as Glazer and Rubinstein (1998) and Eliaz (2002).   6
2. Basic Results 
 
Consider a situation where a principal is unable to choose the desirable alternative 
from a nonempty and finite set of alternatives A. Further, there exist three agents, i.e., 
agents 1, 2, and 3, who have a full knowledge of the type of alternative that the principal 
should choose. The latter delegates the alternative choice to the three agents using the 
following process, which is a simpler version of the Abreu-Matsushima mechanism (Abreu 
and Matsushima (1992a, 1994)). The principal requires each agent to announce K  number 
of times the choice that she should make, following which she randomly selects one 
announcement profile from the first  1 − K  profiles.  Here,  0 > K  is  a  sufficiently large 
positive integer. If at least two agents announce the same alternative, she chooses that 
alternative. In the absence of such an alternative, she chooses the “status quo” that is given 
by aA ∈ . She imposes a fine of  0 ε >  if and only if the agent is either agent 2 or agent 3 
and is the first to deviate from the first announcement made by agent 1. We assume that the 
monetary fine ε  is close to zero. 
Formally, we specify a mechanism  (, , ) GM g t =  as follows, where  i M  is the set of 






= ∏ , ∆ denotes the set of lotteries over 
alternatives,  ∆ → M x: ,  N i i t t ∈ = ) (,  a n d   : { , 0 } i tM ε →− . When the agents announce a 
message profile  M m m N i i ∈ = ∈ ) ( , the principal chooses any alternative aA ∈  with  the 
probability  () [ ] x ma and makes a monetary transfer  () i tm to each agent i with certainty. 
Let   7
K
i A M =  for all  N i∈ . 
Let  K i i i M M M , 1 , × ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ × = , where  A M k i = ,  for all  {1,..., } kK ∈ . For every  M m∈ , let 
, #{ {2,..., }| }
() [ ]
1






 for all aa ≠ , 
    () []1 () [ ]
aa
x ma x ma
≠
=− ∑ , 
    1() 0 tm= , 
for every  } 3 , 2 { ∈ i , 
() i tm ε = −  if  there  exist  {1,..., } kK ∈  such that  ,1 , 1 ik mm ≠  and 
2, 3, 1,1 hh mmm ==  for all  } 1 ,..., 1 { − ∈ k h , 
and 
() 0 i tm=    if there exists no such k . 
For every  {2,..., } kK ∈ , the principal selects the  th k −  announcement  profile 
3




 and chooses any alternative  A a∈  if at least 
two agents announce this alternative, i.e.,  a m k i = ,  for at least two agents  {1,2,3} i∈ . In the 
absence of such an alternative, she chooses the status quo a . Each agent  } 3 , 2 { ∈ i  is fined 
if and only if she is the first to deviate from the first announcement  1,1 m  made by agent 1. It 
should be noted that the latter is never fined. 
Choose an arbitrary alternative  A a ∈
*  and regard it as the desirable alternative that 
the principal should choose. A preference for each agent  {1, 2, 3} i∈ , denoted by 
i ∼   , is   8
defined on the set  {, 0 } M ε ∆×− × . Here, (,,) ( ,, ) ii
i
rm rm α α′ ′′
∼    implies “agent i  does not 
prefer ( , , ) i rm α′′ ′ to  ( , , ) i rm α ”. ( , , ) ( , , ) ii i rm rm α α′ ′′    implies  “ ( , , ) ( , , ) ii
i
rm rm α α′′ ′
∼    but 
[ ( ,, ) (,, ) ] ii
i
rm rm α α ′′′
∼ ∼  ; in other words, agent i prefers (,,) i rm α  to (, ,) i rm α′′ ′ ”. Moreover, 
(,,) ( ,, ) ii i rm rm α α′′ ′ ∼  implies  “ ( , , ) ( , , ) ii
i
rm rm α α′ ′′
∼    and  ( , , ) ( , , ) ii
i
rm rm α α ′ ′′
∼   ; in other 
words, agent i is indifferent between (,,) i rm α  and (, ,) i rm α′ ′′ ”. Let  {1,2,3} () i
i
∈ =
∼∼    . 
 
Condition 1: For every  {1, 2, 3} i∈ , (,,) { , 0 } i rm M α ε ∈∆× − × , and  \{ } ii i mMm ′∈ , 
(1)     (,, ( , ) ) (,,) iiii i rm m r m α α − ′    if 
*
,, {, } ik ik ma m ′ ∈  and 
**
,, [] [] ik ik ma ma ′ =⇒ = 
for all  } ,..., 1 { K k ∈ . 
 
  Condition 1 implies that each agent is sufficiently honest to dislike any white lie that 
does not ever influence the alternative choice and the monetary transfer made to her. 
 
Condition 2: For every  {1,2,3} i∈ , ( , ) mM α ∈∆× , and α′∈∆, 
(2)     (, 0 ,) ( , ,) i mm α αε ′ −    if 
1









Condition 2 along with a sufficiently large K   implies that the utility difference 
between two lotteries is almost negligible if these lotteries are close to each other in terms 
of the amount.   9
A combination (,) G
∼    defines a game. The solution concept is iterative dominance. 
Let  i i M M =







= ∏ . Recursively, for every  1,2,... λ = , let 
()
i M
λ  denote 
the set of messages 
(1 )
ii mM
λ− ∈   for each agent i  that  are  undominated with respect to 
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= ∩ . A message profile  M m∈   is said to be 
iteratively undominated (,) G
∼    if 
) (∞ ∈M m . Let  i i M m ∈
*  denote the honest message for 
agent  i  where 
* *
, a m k i =  for  all  } ,..., 1 { K k∈ . The honest message profile 
**
{1,2,3} () ii mm M ∈ =∈  induces the desirable alternative 
* a  with no monetary transfers, i.e., 
   
** () [ ] 1 xm a =  and 
* ()0 i tm =  for all  } 3 , 2 , 1 { ∈ i . 
 
Theorem 1: The honest message profile 
* mM ∈  is uniquely iteratively undominated in 
(,) G
∼    if Conditions 1 and 2 hold. 
 
                                                 
2 We eliminate only strictly dominated messages by using the same method that was used in the studies for virtual 
implementation by Abreu and Matsushima (1992a, 1992b). Abreu and Matsushima (1994) investigated exact 
implementation, just like this paper does; however, unlike this paper, they used iteratively weakly undominated 
strategies where only weakly dominated strategies were eliminated.   10
Proof: Since  () x m  and  ( ) i tm are independent of  ,1 i m , it follows from Condition 1 that 
each agent  } 3 , 2 , 1 { ∈ i   has an incentive to announce 
*
,1 i ma = . Fix  {1,..., 1} hK ∈−  and 
M m∈  arbitrarily and suppose that 
*
, a m h i = ′  for all  {1, 2, 3} i∈  and all  } 1 ,..., 1 { − ∈ ′ h h . 
First, consider agent  } 3 , 2 { ∈ i . Suppose that 
*
, a m h i ≠ . Let  i i M m ∈ ′  be the message for 
agent i such that 
*
, a m h i = ′  and  h i h i m m ′ ′ = ′ , ,  for all  } /{ } ,..., 1 { h K h ∈ ′ . If 
*
, a m h j =  for all  j i ≠ , 
then  () x m  is  independent  of  h i m ,  and  ( , ) ( ) 0 ii i i tmm tm − ′ − ≥  holds.  This  along  with 
Conditions 1 and 2 implies that agent i has an incentive to announce  i m′ instead of  i m . If 
*
, a m h j ≠  for some  i j ≠ , 
then ( , ) ( ) ii i i tmm tm ε − ′ −=  holds. This along with Condition 2 implies that agent i has an 
incentive to announce  i m′  instead  of  i m  because 
1
max ( )[ ] ( , )[ ]
1







Next, let us consider agent 1. Suppose that 
*
, 1 a m h ≠  and 
*
, a m h i =  for each  } 3 , 2 { ∈ i . 
Let  1 1 M m ∈ ′   be the message for agent 1 such that 
*
, 1 a m h = ′  and  h h m m ′ ′ = ′ , 1 , 1  for  all 
} /{ } ,..., 1 { h K h ∈ ′ . Since  () x m  is  independent of  h m , 1  and  11 1 1 (, ) ( )0 tmm tm − ′ = =  holds,  it 
follows from Condition 1 that agent 1 has an incentive to announce  1 m′ instead of  1 m . 
Hence, we have proved that 
* m  is the unique iteratively undominated message profile. 
Q.E.D.   11
 
  Theorem 1 implies that by using a single almighty mechanism, the principal 
implements any alternative in iterative dominance fully, and exactly, provided that the three 
agents regard this alternative as being desirable. This mechanism is detail-free in a very 
strict sense in that it does not depend on the specification of the state space. This implies 
that this mechanism is independent of the social choice function that maps states to 
alternatives, whereas the previous mechanisms used in the implementation literature were 
well tailored to its fine details. 
In order to implement a social choice function, it is necessary for its value to depend 
only on the agents’ preferences. The previous works generally assumed that agents had no 
intrinsic preferences for honesty and that they were concerned only with their material 
interests. In this case, the principal has to invite all the relevant individuals and make them 
reveal their preferences, which is an extremely expensive exercise in practice. Moreover, 
even if it is possible for her to invite them, it might be impossible to implement the social 
choice function because it generally depends on not just the agents’ material interests but 
also the factors that are irrelevant to their material interests, such as fairness. In contrast, in 
this paper, all that she is required to do for implementation is invite three individuals (and 
not all the relevant individuals) who have intrinsic preferences for honesty in a greater or 
lesser degree and make them announce the desirable alternative (and not the state). 
To implement our mechanism, we do not even need to assume that the principal 
knows the set of alternatives beforehand. In fact, our mechanism can be described   12
thoroughly in the following simple document that she writes to the agents without 
mentioning the set of alternatives. 
“Tell me K   number of times about what I should do. I will select one 
announcement profile from the last  1 K −  profiles. If two of you make the 
same recommendation, I will follow it. Otherwise, I will do nothing. I will 
impose a fine of ε  if and only if you are either agent 2 or agent 3 and are 
one of the first to deviate from the first announcement made by agent 1.” 
Based on these observations, we can conclude that the presence of agents’ intrinsic 
preferences for honesty functions effectively from the practical perspectives. 
   13
3. Private Information 
 
Let  {1,..., } Nn =  denote the set of agents where  2 n ≥ . Let  i Ω  denote the finite set of 




i   denote the set of states, where 
() iiN ω ω ∈ =∈ Ω  denote  a  state. Let  :[ 0 , 1 ] p Ω →  denote a probability function over Ω , 
according to which the state is drawn randomly. A social choice function  A f → Ω :  is 
defined as a mapping from states to alternatives. 
The principal wants to achieve the desirable alternative  () f A ω ∈  that depends  on 
ω ∈Ω, which is not known to her. She delegates the alternative choice to these agents 
according to the following mechanism  (, , ) GM g t = , which is related to the Abreu-
Matsushima mechanism with incomplete information (Abreu and Matsushima (1992b)). 
Let 
K
i i M Ω =  for all  N i∈ . 
Let  K i i i M M M , 1 , × ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ × = , where  , ik i M = Ω  for all  {1,..., } kK ∈ . For every  M m∈ , let 
, ˆ #{ { 1,..., }| (( ) ) }
() [ ] ˆ






 for all  A a∈ , 
for every  N i∈ , 
() i tm ε = −  if  there  exist  {2,..., } kK ∈  such that  ,, 1 ik i mm ≠  and 
,, 1 () () j hj N j j N mm ∈ ∈ =  for all  } 1 ,..., 1 { − ∈ k h , 
and   14
() 0 i tm=    if there exists no such k , 
where  ˆ K  is a positive integer less than K . The principal requires each agent to announce 
K  number of times the type of private signal that was observed. She randomly selects one 
announcement profile  , () j kj N m ∈  from the last  ˆ K K −  profiles and chooses the alternative 
, (( ) ) jk j N f mA ∈ ∈ , where  ˆ { 1,..., } kK K ∈+ . She imposes a fine of  0 ε >  if and only if the 
agent is the first to deviate from her own first announcement. We assume that the monetary 
fine ε  is as close to zero as possible. 
We define a utility function for each agent  N i∈  by  : { ,0} i uA M R ε × −× × Ω → . We 
assume expected utility and additive separability—for every iN ∈ , there exist 
R A vi → Ω × :  and  : i cM R ×Ω→ —such that 
(,, , ) (, ) (, ) ii i i i ua rm va t cm ω ωω =+ −. 
It should be noted that  i v  implies the utility function of agent ifor her material interest and 
i c  is her cost function for lying. 
 
Condition 3: For every iN ∈ , (,) mM ω ∈ ×Ω, and  /{ } ii i mMm ′∈ , 
    ( ( , ) , )( , ) iii i cm m c m ω ω − ′ >  if  ,, {, } ik i ik mm ω ′ ∈  and  ,, [] [] ik i ik i mm ω ω ′ =⇒ = 
for all  {1,..., } kK ∈ . 
 
  Condition 3 corresponds to Condition 1, which implies that each agent is sufficiently 
honest to dislike a white lie.   15
 
Condition 4: For every iN ∈ , ( , ) mM ω ∈ ×Ω, and  ii mM ′∈ , 
(3)     (( , ), ) ( , ) iii i cm m c m ω ωε − ′ −>  if  ,, ik i ik mm ω ′ = ≠  for all  ˆ {1,..., } kK ∈  and 
,, ik ik mm ′ =  for all  ˆ { 1,..., } kK K ∈+  
and 
(4)    
(,,, )
ˆ () m a x ( , ) ( , ) ii aa i K K va va
ω ε ωω
′
′ −> − . 
 
The inequality (4) in Condition 4 corresponds to Condition 2. Condition 4 is 
essentially the same as the condition that for every iN ∈ ,  (,) mM ω ∈× Ω , and 
\{ } ii i mMm ′∈ , 
(5)     (( , ), ) ( , ) iii i cm m c m ω ωε − ′ −>  if  ,, ik i ik mm ω ′ = ≠  for all  {1,..., } kK ∈ . 
This implies that the utility difference between “always honest” and “always lying” is 
greater than the monetary fine ε . Assume that the utility for “almost always honest” 
(“almost always lying”) is approximated by that for “always honest” (“always lying”). 
Then, with a sufficiently large K , we can choose an integer  ˆ K  such  that  ˆ K K −  is 
sufficiently large to satisfy (4) but 
ˆ K
K
 is close to unity, which along with (5) implies (3). 
Since ε   is chosen such that it is as close to zero as possible, the inequalities (3) in 
Condition 4 can be regarded as a very weak requirement for the presence of agents’ 
preferences for honesty.   16
Let  N i i u u ∈ = ) (   denote a utility function profile. A combination (,) Gu  defines  a 
Bayesian game. A strategy for each agent  N i∈  is defined as a function  i i i M s → Ω : . We 
denote  ,1 ()
K
ii k k ss = =  and  ,1 ()( () )
K
ii i ki k ss ωω = = , where  , : ik i i s Ω →Ω and  , () ik i i s ω ∈Ω  denotes 
the kt h −  announcement made by agent i. Let  i S  denote the set of strategies for agent i. 




i S S ,  N i i i s s ∈ = )) ( ( ) ( ω ω , and 
} /{ )) ( ( ) ( i N j j j i i s s ∈ − − = ω ω . The solution concept is iterative dominance. Let  i i S S =






) 0 ( ) 0 ( . Recursively, for every  1,2,... λ = , let 
()
i S
λ   denote the set of strategies 
(1 )
ii sS
λ− ∈  for  each  agent i  that  are  undominated with respect to 








= ∏ ; in 




−− ∈ , 
[ ( (,( ) ) , (,( ) ) , (,( ) ) ,) |] i i iii i ii i ii i E ux ms tms ms ω ωω ω ω −− −− −−  
[ ( ( ( )), ( ( )), ( ), )| ] ii i Eu xs t s s ω ωω ω ω > , 
where  (,,,) (,,,)() ii i i
aA
ur m u a r m a α ωω α
∈
= ∑  and  ] | [ i E ω ⋅   is the expectation operator given 
















= ∩ . A strategy profile  S s∈  is said to be iteratively 
undominated in (,) Gu if 
) (∞ ∈S s . We define the honest strategy 
*
ii sS ∈  for agent i by 
*
, () ik i i s ω ω =  for all  } ,..., 1 { K k ∈  and all  i i Ω ∈ ω . 
The honest strategy profile 
** () ii N ss S ∈ =∈  induces the value of the social choice function 
() f ω  for every state ω ∈Ω with no monetary transfers; in other words, for every ω ∈Ω,   17
   
* (() ) [() ]1 xs f ωω =  and 
* (() )0 i tsω =  for all iN ∈ . 
 
Theorem 2:  The honest strategy profile 
* sS ∈   is uniquely iteratively undominated in 
(,) Gu  if  incentive  compatibility holds; in other words, for every  N i∈ ,  i i Ω ∈ ω , and 
} /{ i i i ω ω Ω ∈ ′ , 
(6)     [(() ,) | ] [((, ) ,) | ] ii i i i i Ev f Ev f ω ωω ω ω ωω − ′ ≥ . 
 
Proof:  Fix  S s∈  and  N i∈  arbitrarily.  Fix  Ω ∈ ω   arbitrarily. Suppose that 
,, 1 () () j kj j k j ss ω ω − ≠  for some  j i ≠  and some  } ˆ ,..., 2 { K k ∈ . Then, agent i is never fined at 
the time of announcing  , ik i m ω =  for  all  } ˆ ,..., 1 { K k ∈ . Next, suppose that 
) ( ) ( 1 , , j k j j k j s s ω ω − =  for all  } ˆ ,..., 2 { K k ∈  and all  j i ≠ . If  , () ik i i s ω ω ≠  for all  } ˆ ,..., 1 { K k ∈ , 
then, by announcing  , ik i m ω =  for all  } ˆ ,..., 1 { K k ∈  instead, agent i can save the disutility 
for lying  (( , ( )), ) ( ( ), ) ii ii i cm s c s ω ωω ω −− − , which is greater than ε   due to (3). If 
) ( ) ( 1 , , i k i i k i s s ω ω − ≠  for some  } ˆ ,..., 2 { K k ∈ , then agent i  is fined an amount ε . Since the 
first K ˆ  announcements made by agent i never influence the alternative choice, it follows 
from Conditions 3 and 4 and the above arguments that agent i is willing to replace the first 
K ˆ  announcements 
K
k i k i s
ˆ
1 , )) ( ( = ω  with 
ˆ *
,1 (( ) )
K
ik i k s ω = . 
 Fix  } ,..., 1 ˆ { K K k + ∈   arbitrarily. Suppose that 
*
,, j kj k s s =  for  all  N j∈  and  all 
} 1 ,..., 1 { − ∈ k k . Fix  i i Ω ∈ ω  arbitrarily. Suppose that  , () ii ik s ω ω ≠ . Let  i i M m ∈  denote the   18
message for agent i  such  that  , ik i m ω =  for  all  } ,..., 1 { k k ∈  and  ,, () ik ik i ms ω =  for  all 
} ,..., 1 { K k k + ∈ . 
First, suppose that  , () j j jk s ω ω ≠  for  some  j i ≠ . Then,  ( ( )) i ts ω ε =−  and 
(,( ) )0 iii i tms ω −−= , which along with (4) imply that agent i  prefers  i m  to  ) ( i i s ω . Next, 
suppose that  , () j j jk s ω ω =  for  all  j i ≠ . Then,  ( ( )) i ts ω ε = −  and  ( , ( )) iii i tms ω ε −−≥− , 
which along with Condition 3 and (6) imply that agent i  strictly  prefers  i m  to  ) ( i i s ω . 
Hence, we have proved that 
* s  is the unique iteratively undominated strategy profiles. 
Q.E.D. 
 
Theorem 2 implies that with minor restrictions on agents’ intrinsic preferences for 
honesty, the principal can fully, and exactly, implement any incentive compatible social 
choice function in iterative dominance by using only small fines. In contrast to the previous 
works, we do not need any conditions, such as Bayesian monotonicity (Jackson (1991)), no 
consistent deception (Matsushima (1993)), and measurability (Abreu and Matsushima 
(1992b)), in addition to incentive compatibility. The designed mechanism is detail-free in 
the sense that it does not depend on the further details of the probability function and 
agents’ utility functions for their material interests. 
   19
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